The Mirage of Friendship: Qatar, Hamas, 9/11, and America’s Dangerous Illusion of an Ally
I. Shadows in Doha: How KSM Slipped Through Qatar’s Hands
In the mid-1990s, the man who would become the mastermind of the September 11 attacks—Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM)—was living comfortably in Doha, Qatar. He had moved there around 1992 and worked as a project engineer in the Ministry of Electricity and Water, securing the position through Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al-Thani, then a senior Qatari official known for Islamist sympathies.
In January 1996, the U.S. indicted KSM for his role in the “Bojinka” plot, a plan to bomb a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific. American officials quietly asked Qatar to arrest him. Instead, a senior Qatari official tipped KSM off, and he fled Doha just hours before the FBI arrived. This fateful moment, documented by the 9/11 Commission Report, allowed KSM to disappear, regroup, and later orchestrate the 9/11 attacks that killed 2,977 people.
This episode shows Qatar as a state that shielded a future mass murderer from justice—an early, stark indication that its loyalty to U.S. security interests was paper-thin when it conflicted with Islamist political sympathies.
II. The Muslim Brotherhood Nexus: Qatar’s Ideological Anchor
To understand Qatar’s embrace of Hamas, one must understand its deep ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan).
The Brotherhood is a transnational Islamist movement founded in Egypt, and Hamas was created in 1987 as the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood.
Qatar has long sheltered and supported prominent Brotherhood clerics, including Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the group’s chief ideologue, who lived in Doha for decades and shaped its religious and political policies.
These ties mean Qatar does not merely tolerate Hamas — it sees Hamas as part of a broader ideological project. While the U.S. labels the Brotherhood as a non-designated movement, its worldview directly conflicts with Western pluralism and fuels extremism.
This Brotherhood link explains why Doha treats Hamas not as a terrorist outlier but as an ideological ally.
III. Al Jazeera: Qatar’s Brotherhood-Aligned Propaganda Arm
No instrument has projected Qatar’s Islamist narrative more powerfully than Al Jazeera, its state-owned media empire.
Al Jazeera was founded in 1996 with substantial Qatari royal funding and staffed from the outset by journalists and ideologues aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.
It amplified Brotherhood leaders like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, giving him a weekly program for years that legitimized suicide bombings and demonized the West and Israel.
During and after 9/11, Al Jazeera was notorious for broadcasting al-Qaeda propaganda videos from Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri unedited, presenting them as “exclusive journalism” while framing the attacks as “resistance.”
Internal whistleblowers and external media watchdogs documented celebratory tones and rhetoric within Al Jazeera’s Arabic broadcasts about the “success” of 9/11, contrasting with their more moderated English-language coverage aimed at Western audiences.
On and after October 7, 2023, when Hamas massacred over 1,100 Israeli civilians, Al Jazeera Arabic ran coverage framing the attacks as a “heroic operation” and repeatedly aired celebratory footage from Gaza. Commentators tied to the Brotherhood praised the “martyrs,” further demonstrating its alignment with Hamas’s worldview.
In effect, Al Jazeera functions as the global propaganda wing of the Muslim Brotherhood—and by extension, Hamas—while cloaked as a legitimate news network. Its dual-language strategy (fiery in Arabic, sanitized in English) allows it to shape Western discourse while radicalizing Arabic-speaking audiences.
This state-funded propaganda machine gives Qatar soft power far beyond its size, letting it normalize extremist ideology and glorify terrorism under the banner of journalism.
IV. Hamas’s Political Sanctuary in Doha
After being expelled from Damascus in 2012, Hamas’s political leadership resettled in Doha. Figures like Khaled Mashaal and Ismail Haniyeh have operated openly from Qatar ever since. While Qatar claims their presence is about facilitating “mediation,” the effect is that a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization has enjoyed political sanctuary in a supposed U.S. ally’s capital.
At the same time, Qatar has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into Gaza—often about $30 million per month at its peak—ostensibly for salaries, electricity, and humanitarian relief. Yet these payments bolstered Hamas’s de facto governance, freeing up the group’s other resources for military activity.
This posture is not neutrality; it is active enablement of a group directly opposed to U.S. policy and values.
V. The Deeper Financial Web: Qatar’s Role in Global Terror Finance
Qatar’s ties to extremist finance go beyond Hamas.
Abd al-Rahman al-Nu’aymi, a Qatari national, was designated by the U.S. Treasury in 2013 as a “Qatar-based terrorist financier” for sending millions of dollars to al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen.
Khalifa al-Subaiy, a former Qatar Central Bank official, was also sanctioned for funding al-Qaeda and even personally assisting KSM. Arrested in Qatar in 2008, he was later released and reportedly resumed financial activity.
The Union of Good, a network of over 50 charities blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury in 2008, has long funneled funds to Hamas under the guise of humanitarian work. Qatar Charity was alleged to be part of this network.
Hamas has diversified into crypto wallets, hawala networks, and commercial front companies, with Qatar- and Turkey-based facilitators managing parts of its investment portfolio.
Lawsuits by U.S. terror victims have even alleged that major Qatari banks and Qatar Charity funneled money that enabled attacks killing Americans, highlighting how Qatar’s banking system has been exploited—or permitted to be exploited—for terror financing.
Canadian audits and reports have also flagged Qatar-linked donations to charities and student groups in Canada, showing how these networks can extend into Western civil society, often under the radar of regulators.
VI. Israel’s Recent Strike in Doha: The Breaking Point
In September 2025, Israel launched a precision airstrike in Doha targeting senior Hamas leaders who were operating from Qatari soil. This was the first known Israeli military action on Qatari territory, a dramatic signal that Israel no longer accepts Doha as a neutral broker but sees it as a direct operational hub for Hamas.
Israel stated the strike aimed to decapitate Hamas’s leadership structure after the group orchestrated mass-casualty attacks from Gaza and Lebanon.
Qatar condemned the strike as a “flagrant violation of sovereignty,” while the U.S. simultaneously criticized the strike but defended Qatar’s mediation role.
The incident crystallized the contradiction of U.S. policy: defending Qatar as an “ally” while its territory hosts the very group Washington designates as a terrorist organization.
This event shattered the diplomatic illusion that Qatar’s Hamas hosting is harmless — it has now made Doha itself a military target.
VII. Why the U.S. Still Calls Qatar an “Ally”
Given this record, why has the U.S.—including Donald Trump—publicly called Qatar an ally?
The answer lies in realpolitik, not shared values.
Strategic Pros (Why Trump and others embraced Qatar)
Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, hosting over 10,000 troops and CENTCOM’s forward headquarters.
Qatar serves as a diplomatic backchannel to groups the U.S. can’t engage with openly. It hosted the Taliban peace talks in 2020, facilitated hostage negotiations with Hamas, and has served as a conduit for delicate regional diplomacy.
Qatar buys billions in U.S. weapons and commercial goods, including major Boeing aircraft purchases during Trump’s presidency, which aligned with his transactional foreign policy style focused on American jobs and industry.
Strategic Cons (Why this is dangerous)
Qatar directly undermines U.S. counterterrorism aims by harboring Hamas leaders and funding Gaza in ways that stabilize Hamas rule.
Qatar enabled KSM’s escape in 1996, allowing the mastermind of 9/11 to remain free and complete his plot.
Qatar hosts or tolerates known terror financiers who have supported al-Qaeda and related networks.
Qatar’s ideological affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood and its state-run Al Jazeera propaganda arm makes it structurally sympathetic to Islamist movements hostile to the West.
Publicly calling Qatar an “ally” confuses expediency with loyalty and misleads the American public about Qatar’s role, making it appear trustworthy while it actively aids groups that target U.S. interests.
Trump’s approach reflected pragmatism—he prioritized maintaining military access and striking economic deals. But praising Qatar as a “friend” obscured the reality that Qatar’s interests often run directly counter to American security and values.
VIII. The Core Contradiction: Partner of Convenience, Not Ally of Principle
Qatar is not a friend in the moral sense. It is a partner of convenience that has repeatedly shown willingness to harbor extremists, fund Islamist groups, and shield figures like KSM when it suits its agenda—while simultaneously hosting America’s largest Middle Eastern base and courting U.S. praise.
This duality explains why Trump, Biden, Obama, and Bush all maintained ties with Qatar: breaking with Doha could disrupt U.S. military operations, but embracing Doha carries the cost of legitimizing a state that empowers America’s enemies.
Calling Qatar an “ally” might serve short-term U.S. strategic interests—but it erodes long-term moral clarity and allows one of the world’s most effective enablers of terrorism to operate behind the mask of friendship.
References
9/11 Commission Report, 2004 (Chapter 5, KSM escape from Qatar)
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Designation of Abd al-Rahman al-Nu’aymi (2013)
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Designation of Khalifa al-Subaiy (2008)
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Designation of the Union of Good (2008)
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organization list (Hamas, 1997)
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Hamas funding network sanctions (2023–2025)
ISGAP Report on Foreign Funding of Canadian Campuses (2024)
Canada Revenue Agency audits regarding foreign influence in charities (Global News, 2024)
U.S.–Qatar Memorandum of Understanding on Counterterror Finance (2017)
CENTCOM Public Affairs, Al Udeid Air Base fact sheet
Civil lawsuits filed by U.S. terror victims vs. Qatar Charity and Qatari banks (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 2019–2022)
Public statements by President Donald Trump on Qatar (2017–2019 press conferences and White House transcripts)
Public statements by Israel and Qatar on the September 2025 Israeli strike in Doha targeting Hamas leaders
Public writings and sermons of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Qatar-based Muslim Brotherhood ideologue)
Media monitoring reports on Al Jazeera Arabic coverage of 9/11 and October 7 (MEMRI, 2001–2023)
