Pathways to Regaining U.S. Access to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan

The prospect of regaining access to Bagram Air Base (BAB) offers the U.S. strategic reach into Central Asia, western China, Iran, and a critical counterterrorism (CT) posture against ISIS-K. However, a forcible return would reignite war with the Taliban and destabilize the region.
This paper outlines the current operating environment, strategic options, Taliban leverage points, and a phased negotiation framework focused on achieving limited, conditional access without reigniting full-scale conflict.

I. Strategic Significance of Bagram Air Base

• Location: ~40 miles north of Kabul; long runways and hardened infrastructure capable of supporting heavy airlift, ISR, and bomber operations.

• Geopolitical Reach: Enables persistent ISR and rapid strike capabilities into Central Asia, Xinjiang (China), Iran, and Pakistan.

• CT Value: Offers fast-response basing to disrupt ISIS-K, which is actively rebuilding external attack networks.

Key point: Bagram’s value is unmatched by any over-the-horizon platform, but its reoccupation requires overcoming political, logistical, and diplomatic barriers.

II. Current Environment and Constraints

• Taliban control: The Taliban operate Bagram; they have publicly rejected any U.S. military presence.

• China factor: Rumors of Chinese interest or presence exist but are unverified; however, Beijing strongly opposes renewed U.S. basing.

• Overflight corridors: U.S. access would require Pakistani or Central Asian corridor permissions, which are politically fragile.

• Security climate: Taliban forces are numerous, and MANPADS/small arms are widespread. ISIS-K is resurgent.

Implication: Any forcible seizure would trigger full-scale war and broad regional opposition; diplomacy is the only viable path.

Bottom line: The Taliban have material and political incentives to negotiate — if concessions are tightly conditioned and reversible.

V. Proposed Phased Negotiation Framework

Phase 1 – Confidence Building

• Provide strictly humanitarian aid through neutral intermediaries (UN, Qatar, UAE).

• Begin discreet talks via third-party mediators.

• Offer limited sanctions waivers for humanitarian banking channels.

Phase 2 – CT Cooperation and Access

• Propose intelligence sharing on ISIS-K activity.

• Offer equipment or training for airport security under Taliban control.

• Establish a small joint “CT Coordination Cell” inside Bagram under Taliban sovereignty.

Phase 3 – Limited Operational Access

• Negotiate U.S. episodic access (e.g. for hostage rescue or counter-ISIS operations).

• Guarantee non-interference with Taliban domestic affairs.

• In exchange, offer targeted development/infrastructure packages (power, air traffic management).

Phase 4 – Conditional Expansion

• Only if earlier phases succeed: establish a permanent compound under strict rules (no combat ops from base, CT only).

• Continue to tie all engagement to measurable CT cooperation and human rights benchmarks.

VI. Risk and Mitigation

Risks

• Political backlash in U.S. and Afghanistan for perceived legitimizing of the Taliban

• Taliban use of leverage to extract concessions without real cooperation

• Chinese, Russian, Iranian countermoves to undermine U.S. presence

• Potential insider or terror attacks on any U.S. footprint

Mitigation

• Use intermediaries as face of the deal (Qatar/UAE/Turkey)

• Make all concessions reversible and conditional

• Maintain full over-the-horizon strike capability as deterrent

• Require third-party verification of Taliban compliance

VII. Strategic Decision Points

Leaders must decide on:

1. How much political capital to expend on negotiating with the Taliban.

2. Which concessions are acceptable (assets, sanctions, recognition).

3. How much operational risk is acceptable (U.S. personnel on the ground).

4. What the clear exit strategy is if cooperation fails.

VIII. Bottom Line

• Forceful reoccupation of Bagram is militarily possible but strategically unsound and would reignite war.

• Negotiated, compartmented access is the only viable pathway.

• The Taliban’s economic desperation, quest for legitimacy, and fight against ISIS-K create narrow but real leverage for U.S. diplomacy.

• Success requires a phased, conditional framework, third-party mediation, and tight operational limits.

  References

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